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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of natural resource dependence on growth in a 
cross-country setting during 1970 to 2010, first accounting for the effect of 
resource export dependence on institutional development. We employ several 
political and governance indicators, numerous econometric techniques on two 
separate panels, including one post-cold war. Our findings suggest there is a 
resource curse adversely effecting growth via institutional deterioration in the 
longer term (1970-2010), but recently (1995-2012) there is a reversal of this 
adverse effect on some institutions. Moreover, certain institutions matter more 
for growth, including governance and constraints on the executive relative to 
democracy. 
Keywords 
Resource dependence, growth, institutions. 
JEL classifications: O13, O40, Q33 
                                                 
 Syed Mansoob Murshed: International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands and Coventry University, UK, 
murshed@iss.nl. (Corresponding Author). 
Muhammad Badiuzzaman: Doctoral Researcher, International Institute of Social 
Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands, 
badiuzzaman@iss.com. 
Mohammad Habibullah Pulok: Lecturer, Department of Economics, Southeast 
University, Bangladesh, mohammad.pulok@barcelonagse.eu 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ‘resource curse’ literature by examining the 
effect of natural resource dependence on economic growth in a cross-country setting during 
the 1970 to 2010 period; more specifically by explicitly taking into account the effect of 
resource based exports on institutional development and functioning. The resource curse 
literature, see Auty (1997) for a seminal contribution, analyses the adverse consequences of a 
rich natural resource endowment, which turns nature’s bounty into a curse. A related earlier 
literature was known as the ‘Dutch Disease’, a term utilised since the late 1970s to describe 
short to medium-term macroeconomic problems associated with an oil price boom in 
particular; see Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) for a theoretical overview. The mechanisms 
involved in this literature pertain to real exchange rate appreciation, and changes in relative 
prices inducing non-traded goods production compared to internationally traded goods. This 
results in an alteration in the composition of domestic output favouring non-traded goods, a 
spending boom due to the windfall of a resource boom, and in some specific cases temporary 
rises in unemployment.    
The newer resource curse literature focuses on the more deep-seated consequences of the 
resource curse. These developments can be sub-divided into three strands. The first 
emphasises the adverse effects on economic growth due to a host of factors, including the fact 
that higher wage resource rich economies often miss the first rung on the industrialisation 
ladder based on labour-intensive manufactured goods exports (Sachs and Warner, 1999).  
Secondly, resource rich developing countries appear to face a higher risk of civil war due to 
possible violent contests over rents (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Third, there is the adverse 
effect of resource rents on institutional development which is said to hamper growth; (Ross, 
2001) on the detrimental effect of oil dependence on democratic development is one example 
of the copious literature on this aspect. This is because the presence of substantial resource 
rents encourages rent seeking, contests over rents, the diminution of accountability, patronage 
and corruption, all of which detract from growth enhancing productive activity.   
Institutions refer not just to the political orientation of a nation, but also the manner in which 
it is governed. In the growth literature, long-term growth prospects have been linked to well-
functioning institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, for example). Hence, institutions 
may be the mechanism in the middle of a variety of causal factors that explain economic 
progress in the more fundamental sense. This begs the question as to what determines 
institutions in the first place.  
Although it is not our intention to present a survey of the burgeoning empirical literature on 
the effects of the resource curse on growth via institutions, it is worthwhile pointing out that 
the chief differences in the literature emanate from: (a) differences in econometric techniques 
ranging from the use of cross-sectional to panel data analysis; in the latter category some 
recent papers have employed dynamic panel data analysis; (b) diverse data sets and types of 
‘institutions’, including whether or not the institutions are endogenous or exogenous to 
natural resource abundance or dependence; (c) and, varying definitions of resource 
abundance or dependence, depending upon whether the study incorporates the value of the 
stock of natural capital/resources, or the flow value of natural resource based (primary) 
exports, or the flow value of the GDP share of primary exports or the flow value of 
disaggregated categories of primary exports.  
One of the earliest cross-sectional, cross-country, empirical studies in the modern genre was 
by Sachs and Warner (1995), which utilised primary exports as a percentage of GDP, truly 
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set the resource curse on growth literature in motion. Another early cross-sectional 
econometric analysis, Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett and Busby (2005) differentiated point-
sourced economies identified as exporters of oil, mineral and plantation based crops and 
found them to have lower growth rates compared to diffuse (agricultural) and manufactured 
exporters in the 1975-97 period because of the poorer governance (based on the World Bank 
governance indicators that begin in 1997) engendered by a fuel, mineral or plantation 
dependent economy. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) find that when they interact natural 
resource abundance with the quality of institutions in a growth regression, the resultant 
coefficient is significant. This means that natural resource abundance has adverse effects only 
in the presence of pre-existing (exogenous) poor institutions. Their analysis, however, is 
cross-sectional, and they do not take into account the potential reverse causality between 
institutional quality and growth. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) differentiated between 
resource dependence and resource abundance, definitions that were used interchangeably in 
many previous studies. Their measure of resource dependence is resource exports to GDP and 
mineral exports to GDP; the per capita value of natural resource and sub-soil asset stocks is 
their resource abundance variable. They correct for endogeneity in both resource dependence 
and institutions, finding that resource dependence has no significant effect on growth 
(although the sign is still negative), contrary to many earlier findings. Similarly, Metcalfe 
(2007) found that the resource curse may not be present except for the 1970 to 1990 period.   
The challenge was to extend the cross-sectional econometric analysis so that it has a time 
dimension, and delve deeper into the role of different types of resource endowment on 
institutional formation, while differentiating between types of institutions, including political 
institutions and governance. Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) carried out one of the 
earlier panel data analyses on data between 1970 and 2000, where resource dependence first 
impacts on institutions, followed by the effect of the predicted institutions on growth. The 
difference between the negative impact of point and diffuse based resource dependence is 
smaller than in earlier analysis, and governance measured by the economic freedom index 
(EFI) can be more important for growth than political institutions measured by polity (the 
degree of democracy and autocracy). A recent study by Busse and Gröning (2013), using 
contemporary panel data analysis finds that the natural resource export share of GDP 
negatively impacts on institutions, especially corruption. Williams (2011) finds that point 
resource type exports exert a negative impact on transparency and information release. When 
controlling for the impact of transparency or other institutions (informational transparency, 
executive constraints and ICRG) the sign and significance of the negative effect of point 
natural resource on growth diminishes, suggesting that the impact of resource dependence on 
growth is via institutional functioning. Boschini, Petterson and Roine (2013) in their 
taxonomic study distinguish between different types of institutions and also use recent 
innovations in panel data econometrics to gauge whether good institutions can reverse the 
natural resource curse on growth. They allow for the endogeneity of institutions in some 
instances, but not due to natural resource abundance or dependence, and try out different 
measures of resource dependence including rents, exports, export share in GDP, as well as 
differentiating between different types of natural resources. Similar to the study by Metcalfe 
(2007), the resource curse seems to get weaker in recent years, and the results for the effect of 
different institutions (chiefly Polity and ICRG) are not always robust to different 
specifications, periods and samples, except for the ICRG governance type institutions for 
metals and ores (but not fuel) exporters. 
We analyse the impact of resource based exports on a variety of institutional determinants, 
before looking at the growth impact of these predicted institutions in a panel data setting. We 
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include political institutions measuring democracy and constraints upon the executive. 
Furthermore, we separately incorporate institutions of governance as well, such as the rarely 
used economic freedom index (EFI), as well as the more frequently employed international 
country risk guide (ICRG). In line with the theoretical reasoning in Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005), political institutions need to be differentiated from economic institutions, 
which we term as institutions of governance. It has to be borne in mind that an authoritarian 
state may sometimes be better managed than a democracy. Our explicit aim is to identify and 
gauge which institutions matter more for economic growth in the presence of a putative 
resource curse, as certain types of institutions may be affected more by the presence of 
natural resource dependence. This is the first innovation of our paper.   
Until recently, the use of panel data econometric techniques in the resource curse literature on 
growth was constrained by the paucity of annualised data. We, however, employ a variety of 
panel estimation techniques, including the generalised method of moments (GMM) method, 
to establish robust results covering a substantial period of time between 1970 to 2010. 
Moreover, we run a separate panel for more recent growth experiences to capture, if any, 
recent reversals after the cold war in institutional malfunctioning related to resource 
dependence. This is the second innovation of our paper.  
Our third innovation is to do with our measurement of the resource curse. In line with 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), we wish to focus on resource dependence not resource 
abundance. A nation, such as the United States, may be resource abundant, but its economy 
may not be as resource dependent if its economic structure and international trade is 
diversified, unlike say Nigeria which is heavily dependent on oil. Our measure of resource 
dependence relates to the principal exports of a nation, which is arguably an appropriate 
indicator of a nation’s comparative advantage, international competitiveness and factor 
endowments. As in Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011), we also distinguish between 
natural resources of the mineral and fuel variety, which we describe as point-source, and 
other agricultural commodities (diffuse). We expect, a priori, a greater adverse effect of point 
sourced export dependence on economic growth via institutional malfunctioning, given the 
greater ease with which rents associated with concentrated mineral and fuel extraction can be 
appropriated compared to agricultural production whose ownership is more diffused. 
Entrepreneurs in such an environment may choose to become corrupt rent-seekers rather than 
engage in the ordinary business of production, and this constitutes a major diversion of talent 
away from production, see Torvik (2002), for example. Moreover, in some societies rent-
seeking is more widespread than others, depending on the institutional environment, referred 
to as ‘grabber’ friendly institutions by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006), as opposed to 
producer friendly institutions. In the theoretical model in Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres 
(2004), corruption or rent-seeking not only detracts from normal production, but can even 
diminish the availability of productive capital over time, and a lower capital stock is what 
causes the eventual decline in growth. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two outlines our empirical strategy, our 
results are presented in section 3, and finally section 4 concludes.       
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2. Data and Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the relationship between natural resource dependence and economic growth 
via institutional development, we employ two sets of cross-country panels. The first panel 
comprises of 63 developing countries for the period of 1970-2010 (based on a five year 
moving average), and the second panel consists of 86 developing countries over the more 
recent period of 1995-2012 (annual data). We may regard the second panel to be a sub-set of 
the first panel extended by two years focussing on more recent experience. The list of 
countries for both panels is provided in appendix Table A1. The analysis of first panel in our 
study can be viewed as an extension of the work of Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) 
since we update data until 2010. The second panel focuses on more recent times so as to 
gauge the impact, if any, of the reversal of the adverse institutional effect of the resource 
curse, following the post-1991 wave of democratic development and greater emphasis on 
good governance. Most importantly, the second panel also allows us to use a different set of 
data on institutional development (ICRG), along with increased country coverage.  
Data Description 
To classify the resource dependency of the selected countries, we first identify two major 
export items based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC-3) from UNCTAD 
(2014). Subsequently, the export commodities were grouped into the following categories: (i) 
point-source natural resources (minerals and fuels); (ii) diffuse natural resource (agricultural); 
(iii) coffee or cocoa; and, (iv) manufacturing. Coffee and cocoa were further categorized as 
point source as these crops are produced and distributed in a more concentrated manner like 
minerals, following arguments in Isham, Woolcock and Busby (2005) and Mavrotas, 
Murshed and Torres (2011). The share of point, diffuse and manufactured exports to the two 
principal export items was obtained, which is a continuous variable in our study. Principal 
exports are argued to be a more reliable indicator of a nation’s resource dependency, as it 
indicates both external competitiveness and international comparative advantage, which can 
vary over time as relative factor endowments change. Also, this variable may is a superior 
indicator of resource dependency in total exports compared to the GDP share of exports, 
which reflects overall trade dependency or openness, rather than resource dependency per se.  
We utilise a variety of institutional indicators, relying on data sets for which information is 
available for the entire sample period (1970-2010), with the exception of the widely used 
ICRG data set, which only commences from1984. The first set of institutional indicators 
pertain more to a nation’s systemic characteristics and are more process based—whether or 
not it is democracy, the degree of democracy or autocracy and whether there are checks and 
balances to executive power. It has to be borne in mind that democracies are not always well 
governed, and autocracies are not invariably poorly managed. The second group of 
institutional indicators quantify the quality of national governance. Governance indicators are 
more ‘outcome’ based; more a product of policy choices rather than the established, and 
difficult to alter, rules of the game (constitutions) that govern political systems.      
We use the Polity2 variable which gives a combined score on both democracy and autocracy, 
with a range of between -10 and +10, with +10 being the highest democracy score, and -10 
the maximum autocracy score. In this calculation, each country is assigned both a democracy 
and autocracy score. Established democracies usually get a democracy score of 10, and an 
autocracy score of 0, making its average polity score 10. Many developing countries, even 
after the third wave of democratisation following the cold war, are imperfect democracies, 
combining democratic principles of multi-party elections (often marred by violence and 
malpractice) with autocratic powers vested in the elected executive. In these countries, both 
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the democratic and autocratic scores are strictly non-zero, with the combined number often 
ranging from -6 to +6. A higher non-negative Polity score indicates a greater degree of 
democracy. Table 1 indicates that the mean sample polity score increased in the 1995 to 2012 
period, but is still far from perfect or desirable democracy score of 8 or above.  
This brings us to the second political institutional data set employed in our analysis. The 
executive constraints data in the Polity IV dataset reflect the extent of institutional constraints 
on the decision-making powers of the chief executive (individual or collective), and can be 
argued to be more salient in our era of universal (imperfect) multi-party electoral practice 
because it allows for independent policy making. It is similar to the notion of horizontal 
accountability and the possible separation of powers; even dictators can be bound by 
institutional constraints. The functioning of chief executives can be limited by any 
accountability group in the polity. The degree of constraints on executive are coded on a scale 
of 1 to 7 where the lowest value (1) refers to unlimited executive authority, while the highest 
value (7) refers to executive parity or subordination (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2014). Both 
Polity democracy scores and constraints on the executive tend to be higher for manufactures 
exporters.      
Table 1 indicates that point sourced exporters tend to be richer (per-capita income) than 
diffuse exporters, and also more than manufactured goods exporters in more recent times, 
perhaps pointing to the effects of the recent commodity price boom, as well as the entry of 
many low-income countries into manufactured exporting. When taking the average across the 
1970 to 2010 period, point sourced exporters have the lowest growth rates compared to 
manufactures exporters, with diffuse economies in the middle. In the 1995 to 2012 period 
diffuse exporters have the lowest growth rates, again due, perhaps, to the resource boom in 
the past boosting incomes in point sourced exporting nations.   
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) is our first indicator of governance (see, Gwartney, 
Lawson and Hall, 2014), and is more akin to the ‘economic’ institutions discussed in 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), and Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011). The 
EFI index consists of five major components: (i) size of government and taxation; (ii) private 
property and the rule of law; (iii) sound money; (iv) trade regulation and tariffs; and (v) 
regulation of business, labour and capital markets. This index has a maximum score of 10. 
Although the country coverage is more limited than ICRG, it has a longer time span and 
extends to the entire period of our analysis. Table 1 indicates that the average between 1970 
and 2010 is lower than for the recent 1995 to 2012 sub-period. Although manufactured goods 
exporters do best, diffuse exporters do marginally worse than point-sourced exporters, due 
perhaps to the fact that the diffuse export based economy is on average poorer.     
Our second governance data set is the well known ICRG (international country risk guide), 
utilised in our second panel due to the fact that it only begins in 1984 with a limited country 
coverage, which increases at later dates. The composite or aggregate ICRG index consists of 
three broad categories of indicators: political, financial and economic risk. The latter two 
categories of variables are akin to macroeconomic indicators of debt, exchange rate 
instability and so on. Therefore, we do not employ them as they do not really correspond to 
our understanding of ‘institutions’. We use the aggregate ICRG index, and the five ICRG 
political indicators of institutional quality separately: government stability, corruption, law 
and order, investment profile, and bureaucracy quality. All these variables are measured in 
different scales, but the highest value always indicates a better status (Howel, 2013). There is 
little difference in the average performance of different types of exporters, with manufactured 
goods exporters doing slightly better than point and diffuse economies, with the worst 
outcomes generally for the poorer diffuse exporter economies.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
Among other standard growth regressors are a proxy for human capital obtained from the 
Barro and Lee (2010) dataset. We also employ lagged investment (gross fixed capital 
formation) as an indicator of the current capital stock. We include initial GDP per capita as a 
proxy for convergence, hypothesising this coefficient to be negative. Other control variables 
include some important macroeconomic indicators such as the real exchange rate, whose 
appreciation (fall) would indicate possible ‘Dutch’ disease effects by making certain exports 
less internationally competitive, as well as the terms of trade defined as the ratio of export to 
import prices whose increase would indicate greater growth prospects, ceteris paribus. The 
detailed definition of variables and their sources are given in appendix Table A2.  
Variables Base Sample Point Diffuse Manufacturing 
 
First panel of 63 countries over 1970-2010 period 
Polity2 
Number of observations 
0.49 (6.694) 
504 
0.09 (6.818) 
305 
-0.15 (6.517) 
136 
3.69 (5.543) 
64 
Executive constraints 
Number of observations 
4.047 (2.215) 
483 
3.955 (2.237) 
290 
3.787 (2.227) 
132 
5.064 (1.801) 
62 
Economic Freedom Index 
Number of observations  
5.42 (1.157) 
470 
5.29 (1.196) 
284 
5.24 (0.978) 
125 
6.36 (0.810) 
62 
Growth of GDP per capita 
Number of observations 
1.47 (3.112) 
494 
1.19 (3.213) 
298 
1.70 (3.208) 
134 
2.31 (2.083) 
62 
GDP per capita 
Number of observations 
2,179 (2,282) 
481 
2,377 (2,566) 
292 
1,551 (1,436) 
129 
2,564 (2,050) 
60 
Second panel of 86 countries over 1995-2012 period 
Polity2 
Number of observations 
1.873 (6.169) 
1,526 
1.229 (6.362) 
945 
2.347 (5.602) 
248 
3.348 (5.731) 
333 
Executive constraints 
Number of observations 
4.350 (1.915) 
1,464 
4.178 (1.981) 
909 
4.368 (1.869) 
231 
4.830 (1.666) 
323 
Economic Freedom Index 
Number of observations 
6.322 (0.956) 
936 
6.305 (1.031) 
559 
5.931 (0.914) 
134 
6.577 (0.684) 
243 
ICRG Aggregate Index 
Number of observations 
64.54( 9.95) 
1548 
65.50 (9.59) 
965 
58.93(10.95) 
249 
66.02( 8.65) 
333 
Government stability 
Number of observations 
8.518 (1.713) 
1,548 
8.631 (1.646) 
965 
7.872 (1.836) 
249 
8.679 (1.703) 
333 
Corruption 
Number of observations 
2.284(0.860) 
1,548 
2.290(0.869) 
965 
2.157(0.934) 
249 
2.368(0.762) 
333 
Law and order 
Number of observations 
3.257 (1.156) 
1,548 
3.301 (1.153) 
965 
3.022 (1.151) 
249 
3.304 (1.153) 
333 
Bureaucracy quality 
Number of observations 
1.666 (0.838) 
1,548 
1.691 (0.808) 
965 
1.487 (0.900) 
249 
1.730 (0.862) 
333 
Investment profile 
Number of observations 
7.261 (2.183) 
1,548 
7.359 (2.218) 
965 
6.682 (2.280) 
249 
7.410 (1.931) 
333 
Growth of GDP per capita 
Number of observations 
2.391 (6.048) 
1,471 
2.238 (6.093) 
924 
1.604 (4.282) 
221 
3.365 (6.806) 
325 
GDP per capita 
Number of observations 
3,518 (6,150) 
1,453 
4,419 (7,410) 
911 
1,285 (1,470) 
216 
2,484 (2,674) 
325 
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Econometric Methods 
We apply a simultaneous equation model strategy to understand the nature of the nexus 
between economic development and institutional development. This procedure corrects for 
the possible reverse causality problem, or in other words, endogeneity issues between 
institutions and economic growth. Our first equation estimates the relationship between 
institutional development and resource dependency, thus explicitly endogenising institutions 
to resource dependence, while the second equation estimates the impact of institutions 
already influenced by resource dependency (predicted values) on growth, as in Mavrotas, 
Murshed and Torres (2011). The two equations may be written as:  
Institutional Developmentit = α1 + α2 Pointit + α3 Diffuseit + ϕ1Zit + ui + eit                           (1) 
Economic Growthit = β1 + β2 Predicted Institutionsit + ϕ1Zit + ηi + νit                                  (2) 
We apply instrumental variable (IV) regression approaches in both pooled and panel settings, 
using a variety of regression techniques. The variable point and diffuse as the proportion of 
country’s principal exports is our proxy for natural resource dependency, and also acts as an 
instrumental variable for institutional development across various regression equations, and 
subsequently the predicted value of institutional development is plugged into the economic 
growth equation. Both equations have unobserved country specific and time invariant error 
terms (ui, ηi), and normally distributed disturbance terms (eit, νit).  
Following the standard approach in growth literature, we include initial level of per capita 
GDP and human capital in our regression analysis. Our human capital variable refers to the 
average years of schooling of the population aged 15 and above for the initial year of the 
panel, as human capital in particular has a long gestation period from investment to fruition.  
We utilise lagged (one five year period in the 1970-2010 panel, and one year in the 1995-
2012 panel) investment as a ratio of GDP. We also include the standard deviation of 
exchange rate and terms of trade on a five-year moving average basis (for first panel of 1970-
2010) to capture macroeconomic instability and possible ‘Dutch’ disease mechanisms. 
Inclusion of these variables also control for possible non-political economy channels that can 
also affect economic growth. For the second panel (1995-2012), we take the first difference 
for these two variables (exchange rate and terms of trade) since it is an annual dataset. We 
take two measures of the exchange rate where the real effective exchange rate is applied in 
the first panel, and the official exchange rate is used in the second panel due to data 
limitations. All the macroeconomic control variables are denoted by vector Zi.  
We use several panel regression techniques, starting with a pooled OLS regression using two 
stage instrumental variable techniques. At the start, we estimated a fixed effect model with 
time dummies to see whether time has any effect in addition to controlling for country fixed 
effects. Joint tests (F-statistics) of time dummies do not show any significant impact of time 
in our case. Consequently, we dropped the time dummy from the fixed effect model. As a 
next step, we estimate a random effects model, and compare the result with fixed effect 
models. The Hausman test statistics do not yield consistent results across various 
specifications (in relation to different institutional variables). Therefore, we report both the 
results of fixed and random effects models.  Although the Hausman test suggests reliance on 
fixed effects in a very few specifications, it is more appealing to use random effects as the 
two instrumental variables: point and diffuse are almost time invariant in nature.  Note that 
our regression estimations also control for initial levels of income and human capital; this 
also minimizes country heterogeneity. Moreover, we used IV GMM for fixed effects and 
FGLS for random effects (standard error corrected), to get efficient estimates. The two 
8 
 
instrumental variables, point and diffuse, are found to be valid across various regression 
specifications (Sargan-Hansen test statistics) in both panels.   
3. Results and Analysis 
The results of our econometric analysis are presented in tables 2-13. Each table reports the 
second stage of our IV estimations in the upper segment, with the lower panel of the table 
indicating the first stage regression (predicted institutional value estimation). Each table 
pertains to a particular institutional variable in one panel (1970 to 2010 and/or 1995 to 2012). 
Each table reports six different panel IV econometric methodologies: pooled OLS, pooled 
GMM, fixed effects, GMM fixed effects, random effects and FGLS (feasible generalised 
least squares) for random effects. We may discount the results of the fixed effects estimate 
(static panel and GMM) in columns 4 and 5 of each table, as we are interested in the variation 
across the sample, and given the fact that for most countries the export type is rather invariant 
over time. We can also control for country heterogeneity via initial human capital and per 
capita income. Furthermore, the use of standard fixed effects models may be inappropriate in 
the presence of individual effects (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2004).  A crucial 
assumption in the random effects model is that the two error components (time and non-time 
invariant) are homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated. To address these issues and obtain 
efficient estimates we deploy the FGLS (standard error corrected) method.  
Tables 2 to 5 report on results with political institutions. In table 2 the polity variable is 
positive and significant in several cases, importantly in the FGLS and pooled GMM 
estimates, for the period 1970 to 2010. This indicates that democratic development, and 
greater democracy, is good for growth. For the more recent sub-period between 1995 and 
2012 (table 3), however, the polity variable is either insignificant or has the wrong sign. This 
may be due to the fact that democracy scores improved for most developing countries 
following the end of the cold war, making democracy less salient in explaining cross-country 
variations in growth after some point in time in the 1990s. In fact, in the first stage regression 
in table 3 (1995-2012) the negative impact of diffuse exports on democratic development is 
reversed, as many of the coefficients for the diffuse variable are positive.  
By contrast, however, in tables 4 and 5 the institutional variable ‘constraints on the 
executive’, is significant for the FGLS estimate (and also for the pooled estimates in table 4 
which pertains to the complete period) making this political variable more crucial for growth 
than the existence of simple multi-party democratic elections in recent years. The magnitude 
of the coefficient is generally greater for executive constraints compared to that for Polity 
(degree of democracy). This means that the separation of powers, less untrammelled 
executive power and a degree of independent policy making is more significant in explaining 
growth in recent years. If the positive effect of democracy on growth occurs via channels that 
encourage government accountability, and discourage patronage and corruption, then 
constraints on the executive are a more powerful mechanism in this context than mere multi-
party elections (the main ingredient in the construction of the Polity index). Elected 
governments in imperfect democracies (described as anocracies in political science) can be 
corrupt and factional serving only their own narrow interest groups. Indeed, it can be argued 
that one of the chief characteristics of imperfect democracy is the lack of constraints on the 
executive.             
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Table 2: POLITY and Growth: 1970-2010  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship  
Polity2 0.647** 0.653** 0.177 0.186 0.185 0.165*** 
 (0.319) (0.295) (0.147) (0.116) (0.135) (0.0314) 
Exchange rate  -0.000293 -0.000309 -0.00304 -0.00302* -0.00273 0.000729 
 (0.00143) (0.000856) (0.00250) (0.00171) (0.00221) (0.000475) 
Terms of trade 0.00253 0.00332 -0.0354 -0.0359 -0.0357* -0.0341** 
 (0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0219) (0.0236) (0.0201) (0.0163) 
Investment 0.171** 0.172** -0.0830** -0.0805* -0.0783** 0.0282 
 (0.0694) (0.0695) (0.0381) (0.0416) (0.0350) (0.0190) 
Human capital -1.566 -1.603 - - 0.710 1.165*** 
 (1.537) (1.491) - - (2.779) (0.207) 
Initial Y -1.003*** -1.000*** - - -0.388 -0.608*** 
 (0.369) (0.346) - - (1.807) (0.133) 
Constant 5.467** 5.434*** - - 4.803 3.619*** 
 (2.184) (2.006) - - (11.40) (0.843) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
R-squared -1.093 -1.119 0.048 0.043 - - 
No. of Countries - - 54 54 54 54 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -2.596** -2.596** -5.508*** -5.508*** -4.900*** -2.519*** 
 (1.168) (1.017) (1.549) (1.927) (1.246) (0.565) 
Diffuse -2.478* -2.478** -4.209*** -4.209*** -3.828*** -2.639*** 
 (1.289) (1.144) (1.348) (1.099) (1.209) (0.711) 
Exchange rate 0.00121 0.00121 -0.000519 -0.000519 0.000262 0.00186** 
 (0.00188) (0.000922) (0.00413) (0.00274) (0.00270) (0.000861) 
Terms of trade -0.0671 -0.0671 0.0263 0.0263 0.0135 0.00216 
 (0.0442) (0.0443) (0.0359) (0.0330) (0.0353) (0.0310) 
Investment -0.204*** -0.204*** -0.131** -0.131 -0.153*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0537) (0.0566) (0.0917) (0.0514) (0.0342) 
Human capital 4.451*** 4.451*** - - 3.401*** 6.451*** 
 (0.707) (0.825) - - (1.256) (0.492) 
Initial Y 0.706 0.706 - - 0.824 0.927*** 
 (0.448) (0.438) - - (0.828) (0.287) 
Constant -1.434 -1.434 8.323*** 8.323*** -0.896 -4.275** 
 (2.850) (2.720) (1.665) (2.344) (5.227) (1.936) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
R-squared 0.240 0.240 0.081 0.081 - - 
No. of countries - - 54 54 54 54 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.7084 0.7264 0.7085 0.6695 0.6946 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: POLITY and Growth: 1995-2012 
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Polity2 0.00793 0.0537 -0.528 -0.00202 -0.0498 -0.285 
 (0.273) (0.257) (4.540) (4.134) (1.646) (0.180) 
Exchange rate  -0.000853*** -0.000892** -0.00102 -0.000911 -0.000921** -0.000750*** 
 (0.000223) (0.000439) (0.000878) (0.000916) (0.000366) (0.000177) 
Terms of trade 0.0377*** 0.0328*** 0.0523 0.0432 0.0440 0.0246*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0769) (0.0687) (0.0271) (0.00732) 
Investment 0.110*** 0.163*** 0.0468 0.0290 0.0387 0.0529* 
 (0.0404) (0.0418) (0.127) (0.128) (0.0362) (0.0314) 
Human capital 0.356 0.257 - - 0.507 0.576*** 
 (0.326) (0.298) - - (2.035) (0.195) 
Initial Y -0.871** -0.497 - - -1.078 -0.987*** 
 (0.360) (0.353) - - (2.541) (0.175) 
Constant 4.208* 0.720 - - 6.539 6.264*** 
 (2.413) (2.455) - - (11.31) (1.458) 
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,029 1,030 
R-squared 0.097 0.091 -0.074 0.039 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.808* -0.808* -0.126 -0.126 -0.181 -0.647** 
 (0.474) (0.460) (0.494) (0.549) (0.479) (0.285) 
Diffuse 0.870 0.870 0.0525 0.0525 0.0878 1.222*** 
 (0.683) (0.643) (0.570) (0.791) (0.558) (0.362) 
Exchange rate 7.56e-05 7.56e-05 -0.000186 -0.000186 -0.000182 5.22e-05 
 (0.000308) (0.000182) (0.000131) (0.000306) (0.000131) (0.000167) 
Terms of trade -0.00935 -0.00935 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0167*** 0.00776 
 (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.00533) (0.00614) (0.00535) (0.00908) 
Investment -0.125*** -0.125*** 0.0270* 0.0270 0.0226 -0.147*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0164) (0.0275) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Human capital 1.140*** 1.140*** - - 1.207*** 1.048*** 
 (0.109) (0.104) - - (0.391) (0.0566) 
Initial Y -1.103*** -1.103*** - - -1.479** -0.680*** 
 (0.190) (0.214) - - (0.642) (0.123) 
Constant 7.664*** 7.664*** 2.455*** 2.455*** 6.310* 6.326*** 
 (1.334) (1.384) (0.490) (0.713) (3.751) (0.901) 
Observations 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,035 
R-squared 0.119 0.119 0.016 0.016 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.0000 0.0000 0.6384 0.6235 0.9835 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Constraints on the Executive and Growth: 1970-2010 
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Executive constraints 2.122* 2.103* 0.500 0.546 0.548 3.100*** 
 (1.199) (1.115) (0.453) (0.381) (0.412) (0.593) 
Exchange rate  0.000560 0.000542 -0.00192 -0.00178 -0.00131 0.00111** 
 (0.00143) (0.00167) (0.00286) (0.00235) (0.00229) (0.000547) 
Terms of trade 0.0144 0.0137 -0.0456** -0.0451** -0.0454** 0.0388* 
 (0.0501) (0.0477) (0.0221) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0229) 
Investment 0.154** 0.154** -0.0798** -0.0760* -0.0696** 0.186*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0763) (0.0348) (0.0408) (0.0318) (0.0356) 
Human capital -1.735 -1.712 - - 0.597 -3.882*** 
 (1.728) (1.678) - - (1.673) (1.042) 
Initial Y  -1.062** -1.049** - - -0.383 -1.783*** 
 (0.458) (0.455) - - (1.069) (0.248) 
Constant -1.915 -1.937 - - 2.733 0.137 
 (3.590) (3.375) - - (6.746) (1.159) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 306 
R-squared -1.671 -1.636 0.011 -0.003 - - 
No. of countries - - 54 54 54 54 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.719* -0.719** -1.746*** -1.746** -1.443*** -0.442*** 
 (0.383) (0.348) (0.562) (0.687) (0.425) (0.140) 
Diffuse -0.751* -0.751* -1.319*** -1.319*** -1.207*** -0.655*** 
 (0.423) (0.400) (0.491) (0.441) (0.425) (0.165) 
Exchange rate -7.29e-05 -7.29e-05 -0.00260* -0.00260** -0.000763 -0.000100 
 (0.000616) (0.000926) (0.00150) (0.00109) (0.000860) (0.000749) 
Terms of trade -0.0264* -0.0264* 7.37e-05 7.37e-05 -0.00565 -0.0242*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0133) (0.00826) 
Investment -0.0571*** -0.0571*** -0.0241 -0.0241 -0.0376** -0.0574*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0313) (0.0182) (0.00984) 
Human capital 1.348*** 1.348*** - - 1.104*** 1.670*** 
 (0.236) (0.262) - - (0.371) (0.139) 
Initial Y 0.274* 0.274* - - 0.281 0.389*** 
 (0.149) (0.148) - - (0.244) (0.0815) 
Constant 2.995*** 2.995*** 6.349*** 6.349*** 3.241** 1.638*** 
 (0.949) (1.012) (0.610) (0.761) (1.539) (0.605) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 
R-squared 0.226 0.226 0.076 0.076 - - 
No. of countries - - 54 54 54 54 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.695 0.713 0.499 0.449 0.531 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Constraints on the Executive and Growth: 1995-2012 
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Executive constraints 3.928 3.660 1.714 1.623 -0.598 2.721*** 
 (2.449) (2.425) (3.317) (3.113) (4.468) (0.590) 
Exchange rate  -0.00111** -0.00111* -0.00102*** -0.00101** -0.000882*** -0.000757*** 
 (0.000440) (0.000572) (0.000281) (0.000487) (0.000299) (0.000175) 
Terms of trade 0.0753*** 0.0732** 0.0419*** 0.0419*** 0.0442*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0305) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.00871) (0.00776) 
Investment 0.246** 0.240** 0.000833 0.000798 0.0219 0.235*** 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.0324) (0.0393) (0.0590) (0.0323) 
Human capital -1.079 -0.980 - - 0.684 -0.603*** 
 (0.926) (0.908) - - (1.717) (0.201) 
Initial Y -0.101 -0.108 - - -1.329 -0.375*** 
 (0.617) (0.598) - - (1.336) (0.137) 
Constant -14.57 -13.71 - - 10.44 -9.786*** 
 (12.73) (12.39) - - (21.72) (3.155) 
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,030 
R-squared -2.521 -2.156 -0.100 -0.085 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.259* -0.259* 0.258 0.258* 0.196 -0.372*** 
 (0.149) (0.146) (0.180) (0.152) (0.172) (0.0730) 
Diffuse -0.0714 -0.0714 0.225 0.225 0.194 -0.150 
 (0.215) (0.210) (0.206) (0.177) (0.199) (0.107) 
Exchange rate 7.03e-05 7.03e-05 4.92e-05 4.92e-05 4.89e-05 6.92e-06 
 (9.61e-05) (6.07e-05) (4.68e-05) (6.32e-05) (4.69e-05) (7.40e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.00727* -0.00727 0.00169 0.00169 0.00152 -0.00206 
 (0.00426) (0.00484) (0.00194) (0.00271) (0.00195) (0.00161) 
Investment -0.0421*** -0.0421*** 0.00399 0.00399 0.00195 -0.0522*** 
 (0.00904) (0.00938) (0.00611) (0.00715) (0.00605) (0.00554) 
Human capital 0.369*** 0.369*** - - 0.382*** 0.327*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0319) - - (0.115) (0.0179) 
Initial Y -0.214*** -0.214*** - - -0.307 -0.135*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0632) - - (0.189) (0.0331) 
Constant 5.220*** 5.220*** 4.382*** 4.382*** 4.501*** 5.345*** 
 (0.436) (0.464) (0.181) (0.210) (1.109) (0.249) 
Observations 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006 
R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.005 0.005 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.0140 0.0158 0.8094 0.7893 0.0970 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We now turn to the more outcome based governance institutional indicators. The first data set 
deployed in that category is the economic freedom index (EFI) which has a longer time span 
covering the entire sample period, allowing us to estimate its effect on the full panel (1970-
2010), as well as for the 1995-2012 sub-period. This index contains aspects of economic 
governance: the conduct of monetary policy, the size of government, trade and tariff policies, 
as well as facets of property rights and the rule of law, corresponding more closely to what 
Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2005) describe as ‘economic’ institutions. These are 
meant, in theory, to have a more direct impact than political institutions in determining long-
term growth prospects. Given any distribution of income (and hence political power) the 
security of risky investment hinges on contract enforcement and the sanctity of property 
rights. Table 6 gives the results for the effect of the EFI index on growth for the entire period 
(1970-2010), and it is positive and significant in all but the fixed effects estimators. The 
coefficients are larger than for Polity (democracy) but smaller than for constraints on the 
executive. When we come to the more recent sub-period (1995-2012) reported in table 7, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on EFI is the largest of any institutional indicator we analyse, 
and is significant in all the estimates except for the fixed effects regressions.   
The ICRG governance data set is well known and widely employed, but it only began in 1984 
with limited country coverage, especially for developing countries which we are interested in, 
and country coverage gradually expands as we move through time in the 1990s and beyond. 
Hence we are compelled to employ them only for our second panel, pertaining to the sub-
period 1995 to 2012.The regression results for ICRG composite index is presented in table 8 
and the results for the five sub-components of political risk are reported in tables 9-13. In 
table 8 the ICRG aggregate index of country risk is positive and significant in three instances, 
but the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than for the corresponding EFI coefficient. 
Table 9 gives the results for the political risk category, government stability, which is an 
indicator of the government’s ability to remain in office during its tenure and carry out its 
programme hinging on internal unity, its legislative strength and popular support. Thus, it is 
different from Polity, which focuses on the quality and impartiality of the electoral process, 
as well as the openness of executive recruitment. This variable turns out to be significant in 
contributing to growth in three instances, including crucially in the random effects FGLS and 
pooled GMM estimates.  
Table 10 reports results for corruption, and the ICRG corruption indicator focuses most on 
systemic corruption and patronage networks. Its effect on growth is insignificant, and with 
the wrong sign in two (random effects) estimates, which matter most for our analysis. The 
reasoning behind this puzzling result is two-fold. First, we have taken in a short and specific 
time period. Secondly, during this time aspects of governance, specifically the cruder forms 
of systemic corruption and patronage were on the wane at the behest of bilateral and 
multilateral donors in the post cold war era. Indeed, the coefficients on diffuse in the first 
stage regression in table 10 are positive instead of being negative, and the same applies to 
point sourced economies in several of the estimation methods reported in table 10, pointing to 
an institutional reversal of moderate proportions for the better with regard to systemic 
corruption. Note that this improvement, if any, pertains mainly to diffuse type exporters. 
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Table 6: The Economic Freedom Index and Growth: 1970-2010  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
1.478*** 1.489*** 0.554 0.578 0.924** 1.564*** 
 (0.447) (0.343) (0.462) (0.353) (0.414) (0.282) 
Exchange rate  0.00176** 0.00177*** -0.00215 -0.00209 0.000728 0.00178*** 
 (0.000881) (0.000558) (0.00261) (0.00164) (0.00130) (0.000558) 
Terms of trade -0.0188 -0.0183 -0.0300 -0.0298 -0.0310 -0.0162 
 (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0222) (0.0193) (0.0170) 
Investment 0.0407* 0.0399 -0.0987*** -0.0964*** -0.0322 0.0134 
 (0.0222) (0.0263) (0.0322) (0.0365) (0.0262) (0.0194) 
Human capital 0.578 0.600* - - 0.864 0.434 
 (0.388) (0.331) - - (0.563) (0.274) 
Initial Y -0.588*** -0.601*** - - -0.443 -0.606*** 
 (0.193) (0.179) - - (0.336) (0.133) 
Constant -4.110 -4.100** - - -0.826 -3.883** 
 (2.550) (2.090) - - (3.003) (1.723) 
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 306 
R-squared 0.222 0.221 0.162 0.165 - - 
No. of countries - - 54 54 54 54 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -1.121*** -1.121*** -1.471*** -1.471*** -1.303*** -1.157*** 
 (0.201) (0.147) (0.335) (0.354) (0.223) (0.0977) 
Diffuse -1.110*** -1.110*** -1.413*** -1.413*** -1.245*** -1.148*** 
 (0.222) (0.150) (0.291) (0.213) (0.233) (0.0954) 
Exchange rate -0.000856*** -0.000856*** -0.00173* -0.00173 -0.000963** -0.000795*** 
 (0.000323) (0.000177) (0.000893) (0.00112) (0.000405) (0.000146) 
Terms of trade -0.0164** -0.0164* -0.00319 -0.00319 -0.00905 -0.00894 
 (0.00763) (0.00838) (0.00777) (0.00738) (0.00739) (0.00583) 
Investment -0.000363 -0.000363 -0.0128 -0.0128 -0.00382 -0.00362 
 (0.00865) (0.00854) (0.0123) (0.0202) (0.00959) (0.00570) 
Human capital 0.488*** 0.488*** - - 0.463*** 0.512*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) - - (0.162) (0.0762) 
Initial Y 0.0264 0.0264 - - 0.0232 0.0522 
 (0.0770) (0.0757) - - (0.105) (0.0528) 
Constant 5.879*** 5.879*** 7.043*** 7.043*** 6.102*** 5.746*** 
 (0.490) (0.477) (0.360) (0.462) (0.667) (0.302) 
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 
R-squared 0.215 0.215 0.147 0.147 - - 
No. of countries - - 54 54 54 54 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.6047 0.6025 0.5516 0.4776 0.7951 - 
Hausman Test   YES    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: The Economic Freedom Index and Growth: 1995-2012  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
5.178*** 5.295*** -5.824 -6.257 6.501* 4.454*** 
 (1.368) (1.285) (7.621) (7.671) (3.666) (0.687) 
Exchange rate  0.000148 0.000149 -0.000498 -0.000505** -0.000109 -0.000422** 
 (0.000356) (0.000176) (0.000320) (0.000231) (0.000308) (0.000184) 
Terms of trade 0.0745*** 0.0801*** 0.0518*** 0.0515*** 0.0524*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0239) (0.0121) (0.0144) (0.0120) (0.00752) 
Investment 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.0910 0.0957 0.0262 0.0868*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0330) (0.0976) (0.0959) (0.0459) (0.0157) 
Human capital -0.190 -0.164 - - -0.324 -0.352*** 
 (0.216) (0.197) - - (0.534) (0.112) 
Initial Y -1.652*** -1.711*** - - -1.866*** -1.420*** 
 (0.292) (0.343) - - (0.650) (0.133) 
Constant -20.95*** -21.29*** - - -24.33 -15.72*** 
 (6.453) (5.959) - - (16.50) (3.186) 
Observations 698 698 698 698 698 1,030 
R-squared -0.705 -0.751 -0.331 -0.376 - - 
No. of countries - - 58 58 58 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.337*** -0.337*** 0.0967 0.0967 0.0530 -0.280*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0766) (0.0867) (0.134) (0.0831) (0.0320) 
Diffuse -0.455*** -0.455*** 0.161 0.161 0.120 -0.316*** 
 (0.126) (0.132) (0.101) (0.122) (0.0989) (0.0430) 
Exchange rate -6.74e-05 -6.74e-05*** -2.11e-05 -2.11e-05 -2.23e-05 -6.63e-05*** 
 (5.42e-05) (1.73e-05) (2.03e-05) (1.52e-05) (2.03e-05) (2.06e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.00475** -0.00475 0.000553 0.000553 0.000472 -0.00129 
 (0.00237) (0.00357) (0.000854) (0.000638) (0.000856) (0.00121) 
Investment -0.00696 -0.00696 0.0101*** 0.0101 0.00969*** 0.000261 
 (0.00539) (0.00515) (0.00325) (0.00618) (0.00322) (0.00210) 
Human capital 0.122*** 0.122*** - - 0.125* 0.143*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0179) - - (0.0663) (0.00778) 
Initial Y 0.140*** 0.140*** - - 0.145 0.144*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0361) - - (0.107) (0.0174) 
Constant 5.073*** 5.073*** 6.107*** 6.107*** 4.335*** 4.744*** 
 (0.258) (0.271) (0.0915) (0.134) (0.650) (0.117) 
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 704 
R-squared 0.207 0.207 0.021 0.021 - - 
No. of countries - - 58 58 58 58 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.1521 0.1441 0.7118 0.6939 0.1613 - 
Hausman Test   YES    
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: ICRG Composite Index and Growth: 1995-2012  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
ICRG Composite Index 0.679*** 0.691*** -0.0163 -0.0241 -0.0121 0.628*** 
 (0.171) (0.193) (0.155) (0.129) (0.151) (0.0932) 
Exchange rate  0.000310 0.000332 -0.000936*** -0.000943* -0.000930*** 0.000203 
 (0.000404) (0.000449) (0.000292) (0.000494) (0.000284) (0.000228) 
Terms of trade 0.0310** 0.0308** 0.0440*** 0.0442*** 0.0438*** 0.00676 
 (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.00751) 
Investment -0.0325 -0.0351 0.0334 0.0283 0.0348 -0.0147 
 (0.0435) (0.0574) (0.0297) (0.0446) (0.0288) (0.0240) 
Human capital 0.126 0.123 - - 0.455 0.107* 
 (0.116) (0.119) - - (0.728) (0.0605) 
Initial Y -3.682*** -3.730*** - - -0.957 -3.360*** 
 (0.725) (0.855) - - (1.344) (0.388) 
Constant -16.34*** -16.74*** - - 6.703 -16.07*** 
 (5.304) (5.707) - - (8.560) (3.124) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -0.432 -0.461 0.031 0.026 - - 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -1.838*** -1.838*** 1.044 1.044 0.416 -1.806*** 
 (0.552) (0.528) (0.891) (1.444) (0.807) (0.322) 
Diffuse -3.400*** -3.400*** -4.121*** -4.121** -4.383*** -2.786*** 
 (0.796) (0.938) (1.029) (1.805) (0.961) (0.497) 
Exchange rate -0.00162*** -0.00162*** -0.00115*** -0.00115*** -0.00117*** -0.00146*** 
 (0.000359) (0.000304) (0.000236) (0.000194) (0.000236) (0.000271) 
Terms of trade 0.0141 0.0141 0.0277*** 0.0277*** 0.0271*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.00963) (0.00590) (0.00964) (0.0107) 
Investment 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.0556* 0.0556 0.0650** 0.161*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0351) (0.0296) (0.0574) (0.0289) (0.0211) 
Human capital 0.342*** 0.342*** - - 0.434 0.278*** 
 (0.127) (0.125) - - (0.397) (0.0715) 
Initial Y 4.040*** 4.040*** - - 3.863*** 4.065*** 
 (0.221) (0.219) - - (0.652) (0.127) 
Constant 33.15*** 33.15*** 65.38*** 65.38*** 35.29*** 34.59*** 
 (1.554) (1.571) (0.884) (1.535) (3.862) (0.984) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.458 0.458 0.077 0.077 - - 
Number of Country - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.7433 0.7706 0.6181 0.6331 0.7202 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: ICRG (Government Stability) and Growth relationship:1995-2012  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IVGMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Government 
stability 
2.186*** 2.170*** -0.981 -1.000 1.369 1.674*** 
 (0.686) (0.740) (2.029) (2.146) (1.287) (0.305) 
Exchange rate  -0.000808*** -0.000783** -0.000818*** -0.000815 -0.00100*** -0.000657*** 
 (0.000286) (0.000349) (0.000317) (0.000528) (0.000268) (0.000179) 
Terms of trade 0.0359*** 0.0330*** 0.0430*** 0.0429*** 0.0431*** 0.0232*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0116) (0.00985) (0.00988) (0.0102) (0.00732) 
Investment 0.0769*** 0.0888*** -0.0139 -0.0143 0.0943* 0.0857*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0344) (0.101) (0.104) (0.0485) (0.0159) 
Human capital 0.686*** 0.674*** - - 0.606** 0.501*** 
 (0.143) (0.154) - - (0.269) (0.0698) 
Initial Y -1.291*** -1.195*** - - -1.217*** -1.035*** 
 (0.214) (0.280) - - (0.413) (0.107) 
Constant -12.93** -13.68** - - -6.283 -9.433*** 
 (5.509) (5.702) - - (11.60) (2.623) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -0.498 -0.490 -0.065 -0.069 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.178 -0.178 -0.424 -0.424 -0.343 -0.158 
 (0.133) (0.132) (0.312) (0.422) (0.220) (0.119) 
Diffuse -0.962*** -0.962*** -0.479 -0.479 -0.741*** -1.070*** 
 (0.192) (0.191) (0.360) (0.577) (0.281) (0.174) 
Exchange rate -2.83e-06 -2.83e-06 0.000103 0.000103 8.02e-05 -4.40e-05 
 (8.68e-05) (5.73e-05) (8.26e-05) (7.97e-05) (8.14e-05) (8.38e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.000115 -0.000115 -0.000440 -0.000440 -0.000566 -0.000997 
 (0.00380) (0.00355) (0.00337) (0.00223) (0.00337) (0.00339) 
Investment 0.00811 0.00811 -0.0481*** -0.0481*** -0.0296*** 0.00180 
 (0.00783) (0.00788) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.00939) (0.00711) 
Human capital -0.144*** -0.144*** - - -0.134** -0.140*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0288) - - (0.0653) (0.0257) 
Initial Y 0.136** 0.136*** - - 0.154 0.0959** 
 (0.0535) (0.0524) - - (0.109) (0.0467) 
Constant 8.622*** 8.622*** 10.05*** 10.05*** 9.309*** 9.069*** 
 (0.376) (0.372) (0.309) (0.439) (0.677) (0.341) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.026 0.026   
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.0253 0.0235 0.9596 0.9524 0.7737 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
18 
 
Table 10: ICRG (Corruption) and Growth: 1995-2012 period  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Corruption 10.79 11.58 0.412 0.355 -1.716 -0.260 
 (7.415) (7.157) (1.122) (0.940) (1.822) (1.259) 
Exchange rate  -0.000930* -0.000951*** -0.000914*** -0.000916** -0.000894*** -0.000761*** 
 (0.000509) (0.000356) (0.000231) (0.000451) (0.000232) (0.000179) 
Terms of trade 0.0870** 0.0902** 0.0440*** 0.0441*** 0.0385*** 0.0235*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0431) (0.00947) (0.00977) (0.0104) (0.00810) 
Investment 0.0740 0.0703 0.0304 0.0268 0.0699** 0.0962*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0538) (0.0296) (0.0447) (0.0273) (0.0162) 
Human capital -0.443 -0.495 - - 0.561** 0.295*** 
 (0.584) (0.556) - - (0.218) (0.0820) 
Initial Y -1.555*** -1.601*** - - -0.893*** -0.748*** 
 (0.554) (0.578) - - (0.276) (0.120) 
Constant -10.49 -11.53 - - 8.032*** 4.628** 
 (10.33) (9.781) - - (3.048) (2.062) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -3.706 -4.304 0.034 0.036 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.102 -0.102* 0.289** 0.289 0.102 -0.126*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0614) (0.137) (0.342) (0.111) (0.0447) 
Diffuse -0.0445 -0.0445 0.848*** 0.848** 0.576*** 0.124 
 (0.0973) (0.115) (0.158) (0.415) (0.137) (0.0758) 
Exchange rate 1.09e-05 1.09e-05 -1.10e-05 -1.10e-05 -8.40e-06 2.44e-05 
 (4.40e-05) (3.77e-05) (3.63e-05) (2.32e-05) (3.61e-05) (3.14e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.00403** -0.00403* -0.000596 -0.000596 -0.00102 -0.00152 
 (0.00192) (0.00218) (0.00148) (0.000954) (0.00148) (0.00130) 
Investment 0.00289 0.00289 0.00432 0.00432 0.00497 0.00263 
 (0.00396) (0.00373) (0.00455) (0.00842) (0.00432) (0.00266) 
Human capital 0.0722*** 0.0722*** - - 0.0798** 0.0496*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0148) - - (0.0399) (0.00930) 
Initial Y 0.0674** 0.0674*** - - 0.0682 0.0680*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0239) - - (0.0659) (0.0164) 
Constant 1.416*** 1.416*** 1.895*** 1.895*** 1.091*** 1.476*** 
 (0.190) (0.182) (0.136) (0.254) (0.400) (0.132) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.034 0.034 - - 
No. of Countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.0995 0.1587 0.7224 0.7337 0.1171 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 is concerned with the effect of law and order on growth. The data refer to the 
impartiality of the legal system and the popular observance of the law. This is significant for 
all non-fixed effects estimators, and the magnitudes of the coefficient are greater than for 
government stability. Table 12 reports results for bureaucratic quality related to the 
independence of the bureaucracy from political pressure. It is significant in the growth 
regressions when the FGLS and pooled methodology is used, and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is the highest (in the FGLS estimator) for all the ICRG political risk indicators. 
Table 13 shows the regression results for investment profile based upon country 
characteristics related to the risk of investment expropriation, ease of profit repatriation and 
payment delays. We do not get significant results for the effect of this variable on growth in 
our limited sample period, except in one instance (FGLS) where the sign is anomalously 
‘incorrect’ (negative). Once again, as with the results for corruption, we may be dealing with 
a special period when the quality of governance in this regard may have been actually 
improving, as the signs of the first stage regression coefficients on point and diffuse are 
mainly positive. Note that of all ICRG indicators employed so far, investment profile is 
perhaps closest to the notion of economic institutions proposed by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2005).  
The signs of the macroeconomic control variables are hypothesised as follows: the exchange 
rate (positive), terms of trade (positive), investment (positive), human capital (positive) and 
initial per-capita income (negative). The signs are sometimes at variance with what is 
predicted by theory, but we have to bear in mind that they act as controls on the contribution 
of institutions to growth, and on the impact of the pattern of exports on institutional 
development. The coefficient on the real exchange rate is positive and significant in some 
instances, particularly in the panel with the longer duration (1970-2010), pointing to classic 
‘Dutch’ disease effects. In other words, there is a negative impact of exchange rate 
appreciation on price sensitive exports, and hence growth.     
20 
 
Table 11: ICRG (Law and Order) and Growth: 1995-2012  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Law and order 2.481** 2.018** 1.889 1.663 3.746* 3.398*** 
 (0.970) (0.963) (4.927) (5.130) (2.097) (0.667) 
Exchange rate  -0.000749*** -0.000820** -0.000921*** -0.000911** -0.000817*** -0.000726*** 
 (0.000253) (0.000382) (0.000237) (0.000459) (0.000269) (0.000175) 
Terms of trade 0.0449*** 0.0416*** 0.0436*** 0.0433*** 0.0455*** 0.0246*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.00960) (0.00942) (0.0114) (0.00728) 
Investment 0.0365 0.0744* 0.0461 0.0443 0.0235 0.0132 
 (0.0361) (0.0442) (0.0460) (0.0668) (0.0405) (0.0238) 
Human capital 0.395*** 0.361*** - - 0.424*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0906) - - (0.146) (0.0610) 
Initial Y -1.438*** -1.153*** - - -1.794*** -1.694*** 
 (0.265) (0.332) - - (0.530) (0.198) 
Constant 1.701 0.500 - - 0.244 1.144 
 (1.408) (1.583) - - (3.196) (0.932) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -0.144 -0.042 -0.017 -0.004 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.368*** -0.368*** 0.221* 0.221 0.154 -0.326*** 
 (0.0912) (0.0894) (0.117) (0.221) (0.111) (0.0460) 
Diffuse -0.115 -0.115 0.109 0.109 0.0565 -0.172*** 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.135) (0.211) (0.131) (0.0578) 
Exchange rate -2.82e-05 -2.82e-05 1.10e-06 1.10e-06 4.38e-07 -2.04e-06 
 (5.93e-05) (2.82e-05) (3.10e-05) (9.19e-06) (3.10e-05) (2.96e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.000936 -0.000936 -0.000296 -0.000296 -0.000330 0.000968 
 (0.00259) (0.00260) (0.00126) (0.000617) (0.00127) (0.00112) 
Investment 0.0285*** 0.0285*** -0.00828** -0.00828 -0.00678* 0.0231*** 
 (0.00535) (0.00502) (0.00389) (0.00948) (0.00385) (0.00239) 
Human capital -0.0241 -0.0241 - - 0.00709 -0.0397*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0185) - - (0.0751) (0.00713) 
Initial Y 0.246*** 0.246*** - - 0.208* 0.279*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0351) - - (0.123) (0.0141) 
Constant 1.179*** 1.179*** 3.238*** 3.238*** 1.750** 1.100*** 
 (0.257) (0.238) (0.116) (0.258) (0.723) (0.0956) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.096 0.096 0.009 0.009 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.0003 0.0010 0.7512 0.7102 0.1337 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: ICRG (Bureaucratic Quality) and Growth: 1995-2012 
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Bureaucracy quality 4.332** 3.908** 2.093 2.066 -0.133 4.281*** 
 (2.072) (1.994) (9.265) (7.718) (6.569) (0.722) 
Exchange rate  -0.000752*** -0.000835* -0.000909*** -0.000908** -0.000908*** -0.000726*** 
 (0.000267) (0.000434) (0.000235) (0.000452) (0.000226) (0.000176) 
Terms of trade 0.0491*** 0.0462*** 0.0450*** 0.0451*** 0.0430*** 0.0281*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0124) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.00736) 
Investment 0.0696** 0.0998** 0.0241 0.0192 0.0441 0.0918*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0392) (0.0477) (0.0557) (0.0420) (0.0156) 
Human capital -0.376 -0.331 - - 0.464 -0.414*** 
 (0.367) (0.338) - - (1.193) (0.130) 
Initial Y -1.388*** -1.189*** - - -0.980 -1.205*** 
 (0.289) (0.357) - - (0.919) (0.116) 
Constant 5.096*** 3.536** - - 6.052** 3.645*** 
 (1.114) (1.801) - - (2.891) (0.675) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -0.269 -0.197 0.022 0.022 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.368*** -0.368*** 0.221* 0.221 0.154 -0.326*** 
 (0.0912) (0.0894) (0.117) (0.221) (0.111) (0.0460) 
Diffuse -0.115 -0.115 0.109 0.109 0.0565 -0.172*** 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.135) (0.211) (0.131) (0.0578) 
Exchange rate -2.82e-05 -2.82e-05 1.10e-06 1.10e-06 4.38e-07 -2.04e-06 
 (5.93e-05) (2.82e-05) (3.10e-05) (9.19e-06) (3.10e-05) (2.96e-05) 
Terms of trade -0.000936 -0.000936 -0.000296 -0.000296 -0.000330 0.000968 
 (0.00259) (0.00260) (0.00126) (0.000617) (0.00127) (0.00112) 
Investment 0.0285*** 0.0285*** -0.00828** -0.00828 -0.00678* 0.0231*** 
 (0.00535) (0.00502) (0.00389) (0.00948) (0.00385) (0.00239) 
Human capital -0.0241 -0.0241 - - 0.00709 -0.0397*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0185) - - (0.0751) (0.00713) 
Initial Y 0.246*** 0.246*** - - 0.208* 0.279*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0351) - - (0.123) (0.0141) 
Constant 1.179*** 1.179*** 3.238*** 3.238*** 1.750** 1.100*** 
 (0.257) (0.238) (0.116) (0.258) (0.723) (0.0956) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.096 0.096 0.009 0.009 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.0002 0.0020 0.6497 0.6655 0.6299 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: ICRG (Investment Profile) and Growth: 1995-2012  
Variables Pooled IV OLS Pooled IV GMM Panel IV: FE IV GMM: FE IV Panel: RE IV FGLS: RE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Second stage: Institutions and economic growth relationship 
Investment profile 1.449 1.808 2.827 2.870 2.414 -3.915*** 
 (1.733) (1.642) (8.456) (8.021) (12.94) (0.829) 
Exchange rate  -0.000410 -0.000329 -0.000951*** -0.000950* -0.000786 -0.00175*** 
 (0.000590) (0.000637) (0.000359) (0.000531) (0.000686) (0.000273) 
Terms of trade 0.0515** 0.0532*** 0.0489** 0.0490** 0.0500 0.00952 
 (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0405) (0.00792) 
Investment 0.0608 0.0783 -0.0139 -0.0144 -0.000292 0.147*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0652) (0.146) (0.134) (0.274) (0.0186) 
Human capital 0.324*** 0.288*** - - 0.371 0.318*** 
 (0.105) (0.101) - - (0.442) (0.0561) 
Initial Y -1.770* -1.768* - - -2.483 1.430*** 
 (1.075) (1.061) - - (8.025) (0.479) 
Constant 0.934 -2.006 - - -0.0698 17.18*** 
 (4.116) (3.819) - - (32.15) (2.788) 
Observations 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 1,030 
R-squared -0.260 -0.486 -1.157 -1.193 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
First stage: Institutions and natural resource dependency relationship 
Point -0.155 -0.155 0.133 0.133 -0.0369 0.0135 
 (0.164) (0.146) (0.344) (0.374) (0.269) (0.116) 
Diffuse 0.00810 0.00810 0.113 0.113 0.00266 0.387** 
 (0.236) (0.245) (0.398) (0.386) (0.335) (0.172) 
Exchange rate -0.000298*** -0.000298** 1.15e-05 1.15e-05 -3.91e-05 -0.000258** 
 (0.000107) (0.000118) (9.13e-05) (2.64e-05) (9.05e-05) (0.000132) 
Terms of trade -0.00862* -0.00862* -0.00191 -0.00191 -0.00269 -0.00293 
 (0.00466) (0.00520) (0.00372) (0.00369) (0.00373) (0.00370) 
Investment 0.0344*** 0.0344*** 0.0165 0.0165 0.0202* 0.0146** 
 (0.00961) (0.00896) (0.0114) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.00718) 
Human capital 0.0154 0.0154 - - 0.0240 0.0134 
 (0.0378) (0.0375) - - (0.0905) (0.0256) 
Initial Y 0.625*** 0.625*** - - 0.622*** 0.587*** 
 (0.0657) (0.0709) - - (0.150) (0.0543) 
Constant 2.337*** 2.337*** 7.110*** 7.110*** 2.499*** 2.984*** 
 (0.461) (0.501) (0.342) (0.310) (0.914) (0.399) 
Observations 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 
R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.003 0.003 - - 
No. of countries - - 68 68 68 68 
Sargan-Hansen 
test 
0.0000 0.0001 0.9440 0.9416 0.4727 - 
Hausman Test     YES  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. Conclusions 
We have attempted to make a contribution to the political economy of the resource curse by 
analysing how different patterns of export and resource dependence impact on economic 
growth via its effect on institutional quality. Institutions that are regarded to be crucial to 
growth are not treated as exogenous variables, but made endogenous to resource (export) 
dependence. We also utilise a variety of panel econometric techniques as robustness checks 
for our empirical findings. Remaining within the constraints of data availability, our analysis 
covers a lengthy cross-country panel from 1970 to 2010, with a sub-panel examining more 
recent experiences of the resource curse.    
We also employ a variety of institutional indicators to examine which ones matter more for 
economic progress. We distinguish between political and economic institutions in the spirit of 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005). In the former category we make use of the well 
known Polity indicators of democracy-autocracy, as well as constraints on the executive data. 
In the latter category we deploy the rarely employed economic freedom index, as well as the 
better known ICRG indices which only begin in the 1980s. These last two sets of institutional 
data may be dubbed as governance indicators. It may be argued that political institutions have 
more to do with process, and governance indicators are relatively closer to outcomes of 
policy choices (Boschini, Petterson and Roine, 2013). Yet, several of the ICRG indicators 
and the economic freedom index also pertain to process. 
Our results indicate that governance matters more in determining economic progress 
compared to democratic development in the longer term. This means that economic 
institutions are more salient. After all, a well managed authoritarian state may function better 
in some cases than the imperfect democracies which abound the developing world. Within 
political institutions, constraints on the executive may be more important than the degree of 
democracy, as the former may be more salient to engendering more accountable and less 
corrupt government. In many ways, constraints on the executive are closer to governance 
than political processes.  We also find that the more outcome based governance indicators 
such as corruption and investment profile are less significant than more process led 
institutions of governance such as government stability, the quality of the bureaucracy, law 
and order, as well as the conduct of tax, trade, fiscal and monetary policies. Despite the all 
important political economy (institutional) channel via which the resource curse impacts on 
growth, traditional ‘Dutch’ disease mechanisms via the deleterious effect of real exchange 
rate appreciation on exports and growth remain significant in some instances. 
Interestingly, there is evidence of a reversal of the institutional decline engendered by 
resource dependence in the recent post cold war era. The end of super power rivalry, and the 
pressure exerted by (bilateral and multilateral) donors not only ushered in a new (third) wave 
of democratic development, but also may have improved certain governance indicators. Our 
results suggest that the impact of resource based exports on Polity, as well as the ICRG 
indicators pertaining to corruption and investment profile (containing the risk of 
expropriation) tends to be positive rather than negative, particularly for diffuse type exporters 
in the 1995 to 2012 period. Only time will tell whether these improvements are reflective of 
the temporary palliatives administered by outside powers, or more long lasting improvements 
that are truly sui generis.      
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Appendix Table A.1: List of countries 
First Panel of countries (63) over 1970-2010 period 
Algeria Dominican RP Kenya Philippines 
Argentina Ecuador Malawi Senegal 
Benin Egypt Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Bolivia El Salvador Mali South Africa 
Botswana Fiji Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Brazil Gabon Mexico Syria 
Burundi Ghana Morocco Thailand 
Cameroon Guatemala Myanmar Togo 
Central Africa Guyana Nicaragua Trinidad & Tobago 
Chad Haiti Niger Tunisia 
Chile Honduras Nigeria Turkey 
Colombia India Oman Uganda 
Congo Indonesia Pakistan Venezuela 
Congo DR Iran Papua NG Zambia 
Costa Rica Jamaica Paraguay Zimbabwe 
Cote d’Ivoire Jordan Peru  
Second panel of countries (86) over 1995-2012 period 
Algeria Ethiopia Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Angola Gabon Malawi Somalia 
Argentina Gambia Malaysia South Africa 
Bahrain Ghana Mali Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Guatemala Mexico Sudan 
Bolivia Guinea Mongolia Suriname 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Morocco Syria 
Brazil Guyana Mozambique Tanzania 
Burkina Faso Haiti Myanmar Thailand 
Cameroon Honduras Namibia Togo 
Chile India Nicaragua Trinidad & Tobago 
China Indonesia Niger Tunisia 
Colombia Iran Nigeria Turkey 
Congo Iraq Oman UAE 
Congo, DR Jamaica Pakistan Uganda 
Costa Rica Jordan Panama Venezuela 
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Papua New Guinea Vietnam 
Cuba Korea, DPR Paraguay Yemen 
Dominican Republic Kuwait Peru Zambia 
Ecuador Lebanon Philippines Zimbabwe 
Egypt Liberia Saudi Arabia  
El Salvador Libya Senegal  
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Table A2: List of Variables, Definitions and Sources 
Name and Definition Source 
Growth: GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI), The 
World Bank. 
Initial Income: GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) in 
the first period of the panel 
Investment: Percentage share of gross fixed capital 
formation in GDP 
Terms of trade: net barter terms of trade index, exports 
over imports (2000 = 100) 
Exchange rate: real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 
100) and official exchange rate 
Human Capital: Mean years of schooling for the 
population aged above 15 years. 
Available at http://www.barrolee.com/ [accessed 
on 1 December 2014] 
Export data on two principal commodities; data on 
international trade (export) by items.  
UNCTAD statistics available at  
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/re
portFolders.aspx?sRF_ActivePath=p,15912&sRF
_Expanded=,p,15912[accessed 1 December 2014] 
Polity 2 gives the combined democracy and autocracy 
score of between -10 and +10, with +10 being the best 
(democracy) and -10 the worst (autocracy).  
Polity IV dataset available at  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
[accessed on 01 December 2014] 
Executive constraints reflect the extent of institutional 
constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief 
executive (individual or collective), coded on a scale of 1 
to 7 where (1) refers to unlimited executive authority, and 
(7) refers to executive parity or subordination. 
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) consists of five 
major components: (i) size of government and taxation; 
(ii) private property and the rule of law; (iii) sound money; 
(iv) trade regulation and tariffs; and (v) regulation of 
business, labor and capital markets. This index has a 
maximum score of 10. 
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 
[accessed on 01 December 2014] 
International Country Risk Guide-ICRG  Data  
ICRG Composite Index: The International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three 
subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. A 
separate index is created for each of the subcategories. 
The Political Risk index is based on 100 points, Financial 
Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 points. The 
total points from the three indices are divided by two to 
produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country 
risk score. The composite score ranges from zero to 100. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset; 
Political risk component, Howel (2013) 
 
Government Stability: this is an assessment both of the 
government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programme(s), and its ability to stay in office. It is the sum 
of three subcomponents (Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength and Popular Support), each with a maximum 
score of four points, making the total maximum and the 
minimum scores 12 and 0 respectively. 
Corruption: this is an assessment of corruption within the 
political system. The most common form of corruption 
met directly by business is financial corruption in the form 
of demands for special payments and bribes. Although the 
variable takes this corruption into account, it is more 
concerned with systemic corruption in the form of 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favour-
for favours’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close 
ties between politics and business. The maximum score is 
6, while the minimum is 0. 
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Name and Definition Source 
Name and Definition Source 
Law and Order: this considers two elements, the strength 
as well as impartiality of the legal system, and popular 
observance of the law. The highest score is 6 while the 
lowest is 0. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset; 
Political risk component, Howel (2013).  
 
 
Bureaucracy Quality:  refers to the strength and expertise 
to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services.  A higher score 
indicates that the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure. The score for this 
indicator ranges from 0 to 4 where higher value denotes 
better quality. 
Investment Profile is a measure of factors affecting the 
risk to investment that are not covered by other political, 
economic and financial risk components. It is the sum of 
three subcomponents (contract viability or expropriation, 
profits repatriation, and payment delays), each with a 
maximum score of four points. The total maximum and 
the minimum scores are 12 and 0 respectively. 
 
 
 
